democracyarsenal.org: Redefining Success in Iraq

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Posted by Suzanne Nossel
While the crux of Bush's argument for increasing US troops in Iraq is utterly unconvincing, he's made at least one point that is valid: those who oppose his plan ought to offer something in its stead. As he put it: "To oppose everything while proposing nothing is irresponsible."
Progressives have for years now offered recommendations for how Iraq could have been better handled at every turn; much of the advice was on-target and could have helped avert the current crisis. But voters are concerned with what their leaders are prepared to do in the here and now to address policy problems, not what they woulda, shoulda, coulda done in the past.
Counter-proposals need to go beyond simply rejecting an escalation in the number of US troops in Iraq. If we're convinced that 17,000 extra troops won't be enough to calm Baghdad, it goes without saying that sustaining current troop levels and strategies is a recipe for continued disaster.
But before alternatives can be proffered, we need first to understand what we're trying to achieve at this late date: with even Bush having finally stopped speaking of "victory" what does success - or even avoidance of total failure - entail? Putting aside why we entered Iraq and what we might have achieved there, what goals are still%2

Posted by Suzanne Nossel
While the crux of Bush's argument for increasing US troops in Iraq is utterly unconvincing, he's made at least one point that is valid: those who oppose his plan ought to offer something in its stead. As he put it: "To oppose everything while proposing nothing is irresponsible."

Progressives have for years now offered recommendations for how Iraq could have been better handled at every turn; much of the advice was on-target and could have helped avert the current crisis. But voters are concerned with what their leaders are prepared to do in the here and now to address policy problems, not what they woulda, shoulda, coulda done in the past.

Counter-proposals need to go beyond simply rejecting an escalation in the number of US troops in Iraq. If we're convinced that 17,000 extra troops won't be enough to calm Baghdad, it goes without saying that sustaining current troop levels and strategies is a recipe for continued disaster.

But before alternatives can be proffered, we need first to understand what we're trying to achieve at this late date: with even Bush having finally stopped speaking of "victory" what does success - or even avoidance of total failure - entail? Putting aside why we entered Iraq and what we might have achieved there, what goals are still realistic and worth striving for now. I offer a few for your consideration:

• Preventing Iraq from becoming an unfettered breeding ground for al Qaeda and like groups (to his credit, Bush did propose allocating a portion of the increased troops he's proposing toward this end in Anbar province)

• Preventing Iraq from becoming an enemy of the US - Given the state of our relations with Iraq and Syria, we can ill-afford an out-and-out hostile regime and population in Iraq. This has implications for how we conceive an exit, and how we interpret our moral obligations to the Iraqi people.

• Minimizing American and Iraqi loss of life - Having the political staying power to work toward any other goals in the region will depend on mitigating the ongoing loss of life that has turned the US public so sour on the war. Rising Iraqi casualties are also likely to impede other policy objectives, such as retaining amicable relations with Iraq and fending off al Qaeda.

• Containing the geographic radius of the conflict - Though you'd never know it from the headlines, most of Iraq remains peaceful. Keeping it that way, and confining the conflict to Baghdad, should make it easier to reach a military and political resolution.

• Salvaging American credibility in the region - This is a tough one. While the Administration maintains that any US pullback will spell victory for al Qaeda and its kin, having the US bogged down with heavy troop commitments and scant signs of progress plays right into the hands of Iran. For others to realize that we're prepared to dig in to the point of self-destruction in Iraq may come off not as determination, but rather foolhardiness. As I've said before, by remaining in Iraq (and still more so by escalating) we run the risk that when we do depart, our exit is hastened by events outside our control, such as a Beirut style barracks bombing and mass US casualties. While the Administration argues that any leave-taking will only embolden the US's enemies, the problem will be far worse if we face a tail-between-our-legs, Saigon embassy rooftop style evacuation. Facing up to a tough situation, articulating a redefined notion of success, and then pursuing it doggedly may be our best bet to restore damaged US bona fides in the Mideast.

• Preventing hostile regimes from using the Iraq conflict to their advantage - While everyone agrees on this, there are fundamental rifts about how to do it: Bush is using a tough line, others like Flynt Leverett believe a much more conciliatory approach toward Tehran would do the trick and even enlist the Iranians in helping us in Iraq. My own view is that these are unpredictable regimes, and that an opening for talks with neither preconditions nor high expectations probably makes the most sense.

January 21, 2007 at 09:39 PM in Iraq | Permalink
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Preventing Iraq from becoming an unfettered breeding ground for al Qaeda and like groups...

This is why no one takes your freedom agenda seriously. When democracy conflicts with American interests it is always democracy that is sacrificed.

61% of Iraqis support attacks on US troops. Over 70% want us to leave the country within a year. So just how do you propose to install a pro-American gov't? The Kurds are the only ones who still respect us, and many of them refuse to fight in Baghdad.

A pro-American Iraqi gov't is as much a fantasy as Bush's victory.

Salvaging American credibility in the region

See above, and adjust your policies accordingly.

Posted by: Cal | January 22, 2007 at 05:20 AM

oops, as you can see, the first Suzanne quote was supposed to be Preventing Iraq from becoming an enemy of the US.

Perhaps I shouldn't post before 6 a.m.

Posted by: Cal | January 22, 2007 at 05:22 AM

Susan, it's time to consider that some of the goals you present are in conflict with other goals.

On the one hand we have

Make iraq oppose al Qaeda.
Prevent iraq from becoming a US enemy.
Prevent hostile nations from benefitting.

On the other hand we have

Minimise US and iraqi casualties.
Avoid a larger war.
Salvage US credibility.

Two groups of goals. We can work for one or the other, but we can't have both.

To achieve the first set, we need a draft. With sufficient troops (preferably with lots of them getting arabic proficiency) we can achieve all of those. It worked in the philippines. It worked in panama. It worked for the USSR in poland, hungary, czechoslovakia, east germany, etc. It worked for china in tibet.

When the malcontents know they have no chance to win, they eventually give up. We may need to occupy iran. If we have the will, we can probably do that. If we don't have the will we can probably get the will if we're willing to suffer an event that will mobilise public opinion. Perhaps if unknown parties nuke Boston or San Francisco, say.

To minimise casualties, we could get out. We might find we have our hands full keeping the kuwaitis from overthrowing the Emir.

To avoid a larger war, likewise. Get out.

To salvage what we can of our credibility -- this one is mixed. To salvage our credibility as a superpower, we need a draft and overwhelming force. To salvage our credibility as a nation of sane people, we need to get out.

This isn't a time for half-measures. If we want to win, we can't depend on iraqi troops. I guess there's a possibility that might work but it isn't something to depend on. I mean, if iraq is a cheap gamble -- you put in minimum investment and if you win big then great, and if you lose then no big deal -- then we can just hope it works out. But if we actually intend to win we need a draft.

On the other hand, if we can accept a strategy that allows as much as 50% chance of losing, then we do better to pull out before we've lost. We aren't throwing the dice hoping to gain something, we're making sacrifices because we believe we can't afford to lose. If we can afford a 50% chance of losing, then we're better off not to make those sacrifices.

People who propose little half-measures like "surging" troop levels up to what they were before we reduced them preparing for the 2006 elections, are not serious about winning. They're ready to just piddle around and hope things work out.

I'll say it again. There are 3 choices.

1. Create massive forces that will win. We can try innovative brilliant strategies that might make those forces unnecessary, but if we need to win then we need those massive forces to back up the brilliant strategies.

2. Depend on brilliant strategies and hope they work, no backup in case they don't.

3, Pull back to a better defensive position and decide what to do from there.

The second choice is not serious. Anybody who truly believes we can't afford to lose in iraq, will support a draft.

Posted by: J Thomas | January 22, 2007 at 07:56 AM

I was sorry to see no mention on Ms. Nossel's list of reducing the costs of the commitment in Iraq.

Those we are incurring at this moment are not sustainable for the duration of the period that would be required to achieve most of the objectives on her list. Indeed, the costs already incurred will be difficult to bear in future years, since they have mostly been paid to date with borrowed money. The opportunity costs of the Iraq adventure -- not just in Afghanistan but with respect to American foreign policy generally and particularly policy toward the many areas of the world of greater importance to the United States than the Middle East -- are and have been very considerable as well, and Ms. Nossel does not address those either. For good measure she evidently does not think it worth mentioning that the longer the American military is committed in Iraq the less able it is likely to be to respond to future crises.

I don't denigrate Ms. N